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 “Be a civilized citizen!” 
Corporate social responsibility and the new Chinese secular
“Be a civilized citizen, don’t cross against the red light!”
The automated announcement blaring from the curbside gate at first sur-
prised, and then wildly amused the two middle-aged women, who spent 
the next few minutes laughing and waving hands and bags over the infrared 
sensor to provoke the recorded response. Nearby, another woman, signifi-
cantly older and visibly impoverished, sat on the ground, just below a sign 
calling for a “civilized society” to care for the elderly. If she did notice the 
irony, she certainly didn’t seem to care.
Over the two decades that I have been studying religion in mainland Chi-
na, the country’s religion policy has cycled through a series of familiar ele-
ments: brief but intense campaigns to purge illicit teachings are set against 
a constant murmur of contempt for various types of “cultural pollution,” 
while finite bursts of enthusiasm for resurrected iterations of Confucian-
ism and Marxism form part of a longer trajectory of defining and creating 
social value, embodied in the language of the “civilized” (wenming) society, 
and the “quality” (suzhi) of the citizen.1
Religion – defined both legally and linguistically as zongjiao – occupies 
a very closely circumscribed niche within this larger cultural policy. Even 
as the new Religious Affairs Law2 took pains to constrain their physical 
presence, lavishly restored religious sites have prospered, at least materially. 
Both the public image of the five officially-recognized religions, and state 
sanctioned religious education emphasize cultural tradition, and patrio-
tism over theology. Yet even these protected religions exist within a gilded 
cage, and face the challenge of maintaining relevance as they are physically 
and socially marginalized from public life. In contrast, official campaigns 
to inculcate the public values of state and citizen are deeply rooted and 
pervasive, and visually ubiquitous. In city and countryside, it is rare to go 
1 There is a large growing literature on the discursive use of suzhi. See Ann Anagnost, “The 
Corporeal Politics of Quality (Suzhi),” Public Culture 16 (2004); Andy Kipnis, “Suzhi: A 
Keyword Approach,” The China Journal (2006).
2 Religious Affairs Regulations were promulgated in 2004 and revised in 2017. Translation 
and comparison are available at: https://www.academia.edu/28414977/Chinas_Religion_
Law_2005_vs._2016.
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for long without seeing propaganda extolling “core socialist values” or the 
image of the animated campaign mascot Meng Wa, her name itself a play 
on the Xi Jinping-era slogan “China Dream.”
An image of the campaign mascot Meng Wa, set against a background in the style of a traditional 
Chinese paper cutting. The black characters are the campaign slogan “China dream, my dream.”
By this description, China’s official definition of religion sounds like an 
appendage of its political ideology, which itself might resemble religion. 
There is no consensus on the definition of basic ideas – culture, ideology, 
religion –and what lines separate them. But China has long confounded 
the vocabulary of religious and secular, to the point that it might seem 
reasonable to dismiss the language altogether. This paper aims to do some-
thing different: to leave behind the usual focus on the presence or absence 
of religion to examine afresh whether an understanding of what we might 
call the “new Chinese secular” might shed light on some of the country’s 
key social transformations.
It does so in four parts: It begins by expounding a definition of the secu- 
lar based on terms advanced by Charles Taylor, as the relation of a society 
to its own ideological diversity. Second, it examines how the Chinese social 
and political system is grounded in moral performance, positing an idea 
of a secular order that exists outside of any real or imagined dichotomy 
between religion and non-religion. Third, it shows that the Chinese secu-
lar neither tolerates religion without political condition, nor does it purge 
religion from the public sphere, but rather defines confessional religion as 
a subject of the state-centered moral order. Finally, it shows how the recent 
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rise of corporate philanthropy illustrates the political tendency to co-opt 
independent social initiative through subject organizations.
Where is the Chinese secular?
“Secularism” is a Western concept, that much is obvious. Even in a West-
ern context, the secular could signify many things, from a simple ab-
sence of religion to a philosophy of where religion should figure within 
the political sphere. The precise meaning of secularism is historically and 
culturally specific to individual societies, and can vary significantly even 
within modern democracies. Contrasting the two foundational cases of 
the United States and France, Charles Taylor notes how American secu-
larism originally sought equality among Christian denominations, and 
from there developed its present meaning that government should refrain 
from interference in individual expression of faith. French secularism, in 
contrast, grew out of resistance to the political dominance of the Catholic 
Church. Far from encouraging religious expression, this iteration seeks to 
purge displays of religion from the public sphere. In each case, secularism 
is many things: a set of laws, but more deeply, an iconic statement about the 
nature of the social contract, often expressed in a simplified, idealized, and 
in Taylor’s phrase, “fetishized” understanding of the principles involved. 
In both cases, specific confessional and sectarian concerns developed into 
a far broader statement on how a liberal society responds not merely to 
religion, but more broadly to ideological diversity.3
The possibility of an organic definition of secularism (if one is need-
ed at all) grows more elusive when trying to understand how comparable 
ideas developed in a place like China, one of the world’s oldest, richest 
and most populous civilizations, but one that the Western study of religion 
often seems determined to relegate to the status of perpetual “case study.” 
This disciplinary disconnect should not surprise us. The conceptual vo-
cabulary of religious studies (including such basic ideas as faith, belief and 
“religion” itself) is often a poor match to China, and by extension to much 
of East Asia. Studies of Chinese religion often feel marginal to religious 
3 Charles Taylor “The Meaning of Secularism,” The Hedgehog Review 12, no.3 (2010); 
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, London: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007).
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studies theory, while many scholars of the vast corpus of Chinese scriptural 
and philosophical texts insist, not without justification, that the linguistic 
and cultural uniqueness of this tradition makes China essentially a world 
to itself.
At the same time, western understandings of religion have become very 
influential in China itself. As is well known, the Chinese term for “religion” 
(zongjiao) is a repurposing (not so much neologism as re-logism) of re-
cent vintage, having into common use only in the late nineteenth century.4 
Other terms, such as the one used for the Christian God, date back to the 
sixteenth century encounter with the Jesuits. But regardless of their ori-
gins, these ideas have taken root and developed meaning within Asian lan-
guages and conceptual systems. Late nineteenth century Japanese jurists 
and scholars (even the nativist folklorist Yanagita Kunio was not immune), 
adopted and adapted this new language of religion, and were followed by 
generations of actors who used them in their own way and for their own 
ends.5 The first Japanese constitution in 1889 thus included a clause pro-
tecting the right to “religious belief,” a phrase that appeared subsequently 
in numerous Chinese codes and constitutions, including those of the Peo-
ple’s Republic (e.g., Art. 86 of the 1954 constitution).6 Until recently, China 
had a State Administration of Religious Affairs (in 2016 this office was in-
corporated into a larger body), and a set of Religious Affairs Regulations, 
which were revised in 2018. Every province, city and township reserves a 
formulaic space for “religion” when portraying itself to the outside world.
Yet although the newness of terminology for “religion” is well known, 
its “secular” counterpart is in fact much older. Shisu 世俗, the most com-
monly used contemporary translation, is composed of two characters 
meaning worldly and customary, and appears frequently in classical Chi-
4 Chinese pronunciations given here. The common use of Chinese characters by Japan and 
(at the time) Korea made these terms natural cognates across East Asia.
5 On the changing definition of religion in Asian contexts, see Vincent Goossaert, “1898: 
The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?” Journal of Asian Studies 65, 2 (May 
2006); Peter van der Veer, The Modern Spirit of Asia. The Secular and the Spiritual in In-
dia and China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); Thomas David DuBois, 
ed., Casting Faiths: Imperialism and the Transformation of Religion in East and Southeast 
Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
6 1889 Constitution of the Empire of Japan, Article 28 “Japanese subjects shall, within lim-
its not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, 
enjoy freedom of religious belief.” The American-modeled Japanese constitution of 1947 
(Art. 20) rephrases this to emphasize the right of religious affiliation.
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nese texts with the meaning of “common.” This was the meaning implied 
when the Confucian disciple Mencius (372–289 BCE) said that he could 
not enjoy the music of the ancient kings, but only the shisu music of the 
present day, or again when he spoke of the shisu understanding of an idea, 
meaning that of the common man on the street.7 The neologism for reli-
gion, in contrast, is composed of two characters meaning sect (zong) and 
a teaching (jiao), linguistically signifying the separateness of the religious 
realm by defining it around confessional or monastic structures, neither 
of which enjoy the sort of prominence in Chinese religion that they do in 
the Christian tradition. It is not surprising, then, that this term for religion 
was brought to prominence in the context of treaties meant to protect peo-
ple who self-identified as religious, specifically Christian missionaries.8 In 
terms of historical etymology, secular is the world, religion is a realm that is 
conceptually, and newly distinct from it.9
The poor fit of such terminology to real religious life in China has com-
plicated attempts to conceptually or legally divide the “religious” from the 
“secular,” and is reflected in a long history of Western misperceptions. Vol-
taire claimed that China’s enlightened and rational high civilization was 
free of religion, while the lower classes reveled in ritualistic Buddhism, the 
“highest pitch of superstition” that was “tolerated in China for the life of 
the vulgar, a coarse sort of food proper for their stomachs.”10 As Catholic 
mission spread in China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the Church became bitterly divided over the question of whether Chinese 
ritual activities, specifically the funeral offerings demanded by Confucian 
propriety and Chinese law, were properly religious, and thus idolatrous. 
Less known was the reversal of this decision in the twentieth century, as the 
Vatican instructed the faithful how to respond to the ritual requirements 
of Japanese fascism, deciding in the 1936 papal letter Pluries Instanterque 
that public veneration for the war dead was a civic, rather than a religious 
7 These two quotes come from Mengzi [Works of Mencius], King Hui of Liang II,, 8, and 
Lilou II 58, respectively. A keyword search for the term on ctext.org will reveal many 
similar usages from other ancient texts.
8 Here we see echoes of Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s characterization of religion legislation 
as being predisposed to recognize the interests of self-defined religious communities 
(Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015)).
9 This meaning is similar to the dichotomy used in medieval Catholicism.
10 Voltaire. Essay on Universal History: The Manners and Spirit of Nations, Vol. 1 (London: J. 
Nourse, 1759), 27.
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activity.11 The Church came to view political ceremony quite differently just 
a few years later, when the newly founded People’s Republic expelled Catho- 
lic missionaries, and turned violently against Chinese Catholics. In this 
setting, religion was again seen as a direct competitor to Chinese political 
ritual, especially the political ceremony that accompanied what was often 
referred to as the “cult” of Mao Zedong.12
So where does this leave the Chinese secular? Without a strongly de-
fined oppositional counterpart, the term becomes much less clear. Hav-
ing had no term for religion as an abstract entity until the late nineteenth 
century, China also had no clear conceptual use for the secular as a world 
outside of religion’s boundaries, nor an idea of secularism as a political pro-
gram dedicated to the principle of marginalizing clerical influence. Con-
flicts around religion, such as the violent purgation of a popular sect, or 
court intrigues involving monks or lamas, did most certainly occur, but 
they were not phrased as ones that would define or limit the place of reli-
gion on principle. Applying the idea retroactively is thus of limited explana- 
tory value. Yet as we shall see, elements of secularization theory, especially 
Taylor’s work on secularity in the civic lives of Western societies, do reso-
nate with recent social and political transformations in China.
The moral public
As any visitor to China will attest, Chinese smartphone users (colorfully 
known as the “head down tribe” ditouzu) are uniquely addicted to their 
smartphones. Beyond entertainment, officially-promoted social media 
platforms like WeChat (weixin) have become truly indispensable for daily 
life, most notably for commercial transactions. But WeChat and other web 
platforms are also filled with messaging, product advertising most obvi-
ously, but also didactic campaigns promoting China’s traditional morality, 
“harmonious society,” “core socialist values,” and the “China dream.” Those 
who do look up from their phones will find similar messaging across all 
11 Thomas David DuBois, Empire and the Meaning of Religion in Northeast Asia (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
12 For one of many examples of this sort of reductionism, see John Pomfret, “China and 




public spaces – paper advertising, painted slogans, and increasingly, the 
large and small LED screens that appear in elevators, bus stops and along 
the sides of buildings. Each in slightly different terms, these ubiquitous 
messages all revolve around the basic idea of service to the state, family and 
society. The core message is a repurposing of what are commonly known 
as Confucian values: respect for the elderly, honesty in commercial deal-
ings, and politeness in public. Message boards in parks and along sidewalks 
praise the contributions of moral exemplars, living and dead (including a 
revival of interest in the iconic Cultural Revolution-era propaganda figure 
Lei Feng), who have served society through deeds large and small. Admo-
nitions to public obedience and good citizenship are written in terms both 
of social progress, and of individual personal “quality” (suzhi), a vague 
term that has of late attracted the attention of anthropologists, but is itself 
hardly new.
In fact, apart from their newfound technological sophistication, very 
little of these campaigns is new. Six centuries before the founding of the 
People’s Republic, the first Ming emperor, aiming to restore Chinese cul-
ture after an extended period of Mongol rule, initiated an ambitious pro-
gram of social education, consisting of traveling morality lectures, posted 
writings, and criminal penalties for such wicked activity as neglecting an 
aged parent. The national education and New Life Movements of the ear-
ly twentieth century capped another restorationist trend that had been 
brewing among intellectuals as a remedy to the country’s rapid political 
decline. Like the early-Ming transformation, such campaigns as Chiang 
Kai-shek’s New Life Movement were at their core moral causes, ones that 
sought to rebuild Chinese society around a new individual, refashioned 
by the rules of decorum, etiquette, and civic values. In its early years, the 
Communist regime communicated the ground rules of the new society 
through public spectacle: destructive events like the “struggle sessions” 
that aimed to break down the structure and loyalties of the old society, 
as well as constitutive ones, like the mass rallies that mobilized schools, 
work units and villages around the idea of membership in a new China 
and a new socialist world.
For all of their differences, what all of these historical movements shared 
in common was the ideographic domination of public space. Whether it 
was the arches and shrines erected in memory of deified moral exemplars 
during the imperial era, or the increasingly ambitious citizen education 
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campaigns of the twentieth century, what was being policed was visible 
public display, rather than interior belief or morality.13 It could of course be 
argued that the two were inseparable: that the foundation of Chinese ritual 
(li) is the expectation that rote external performance, for example of rituals 
of gratitude towards Heaven, is the root of internal ethical transformation. 
Certainly, a breach of mores need not have been performed in public view 
to be perceived as a civic concern: ritual norms such as rites to placate an-
cestors or local deities served the common good by maintaining cosmic or-
der and preventing the trespass of harmful forces. But the didactic recrea- 
tion of social values permeated even private ritual. In these many different 
ritual settings – ranging from the ancestral shrine to the show trial – cor-
rect public performance often trumped belief, sincerity or good intentions.
By Taylor’s description, the core of western secularism is the relation-
ship of the public to religious expression, which he gives as a proxy for 
ideological diversity writ large.14 In contrast, the public code of the Chinese 
secular is defined less by the absence or presence of religion, than by the 
active promotion of ideology through a public code of decorum. One part 
of this is the weak role of confessional religion itself.
Confessional subjects
If moral performance was the core of the public, where then was its bound-
ary? Ironically, not at the church gate. When John Lagerwey called imperial 
China a “religious state,” he was speaking of political realities – the preemi-
nence of the imperial institution over monastic structures, and the axial 
position of the emperor in a ritual cosmology that connected Heaven and 
Earth – rather than confessional ones.15 Even as Buddhist and Daoist cler-
gy jockeyed for favor within the corridors of power, there was very little in 
the past thousand years of Chinese history to suggest a struggle between the 
principles of political and religious authority. To avoid the trap of cultural 
determinism, we should remember that as much as in Europe, these norms 
13 On public space in Republican cities, see Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republi-
can Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in Republican China, 1911–1929 (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
14 Taylor, A Secular Age, 2.
15 John Lagerwey, China: a Religious State (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 
2010).
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arose from historical contingency. In China, the question of clerical autono- 
my was settled definitively by moments like the late-ninth-century purge 
of Buddhism from the realm of political power. Rulers like the first Ming 
emperor were happy to reinscribe this precedent as the imperial institution 
continued to evolve. Yet things looked very different in nearby Korea, where 
monastic Buddhism came to a peaceful and lasting accommodation with the 
early Joseon dynasty, and in Japan, where a late-sixteenth century conflict 
with armed Buddhist and Christian militants extended across a prolonged 
period of political instability, ending in a confrontation that violently subor-
dinated clerical to state power for the next two hundred fifty years.
Since at least the fourteenth century, the Chinese imperial insti-
tution sat atop monastic structures and religious communities, their 
ordination and their property, serving as both patron and watchdog. 
The benefits of this relationship were not entirely one-sided. Daoist and 
Buddhist ritual did play an important role in court life, while some rul-
ers, such as the Qing Yongzheng emperor, were known for their friend-
ships with learned monks.16 Yet while a strong dynasty could afford 
to be magnanimous to law-abiding religious structures, transgressions 
would provoke a swift response. Monasteries that had been politically 
allied to the deposed Mongol dynasty lost rights and property during 
the Ming. Catholic missionaries of the seventeenth century had been 
able to gain as many as three hundred thousand converts before their 
public infighting and flouting of ritual conventions convinced exaspera- 
ted Qing emperors to expel them from the country. Even worse than 
political intrigue was dark magic. Popular teachings (especially those 
identified in sources as “White Lotus” teachings) were persecuted with-
out mercy. In addition to stylized charges of holding nighttime orgies 
and stirring up the people with predictions of a coming apocalypse, po-
litical powers feared these groups precisely because they believed their 
baleful magic to potentially be real.17
But in the big picture, such instances of political suppression were the 
exceptions that proved the rule. Formally, the policy of the territorially ex-
pansive Qing dynasty resembled the “legal pluralism” of the Ottoman Em-
16 Barend ter Haar, “Yongzheng and his abbots,” in The People and the Dao: New Studies of 
Chinese Religions in Honour of Prof. Daniel L. Overmyer, ed. Philip Clart, and Paul Crowe 
(Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 2009).
17 Barend ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History (Honolulu: Uni-
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pire, that granted mediated subject identity to internal minorities who, like 
Russian Jews or Hellenic Christians, combined ethnic with confessional 
identity.18 This was quite unlike the Han majority, few of whom embraced 
anything like an exclusive religious affiliation, especially for China’s two 
identifiable “-isms,” Buddhism and Daoism.19 Most people freely mixed 
religious traditions, regarding clergy, deities and temples as resources. 
Structured ritual life was based on clan or locality, rather than religious 
identification in any manner resembling the Western tradition of confes-
sional affiliation. Distinct ethnic communities were quite different. Until 
the gradual institution of direct administration during the early 1700s, 
many of the distinct ethnicities within China’s boundaries lived under 
community self-rule, encountering the Chinese state through the media-
tion of chieftains or princes.
Religious structures often played a key role in the political lives of these 
ethno-religious communities. In Tibetan and Mongolian areas, Buddhist 
monasteries enjoyed the legal right to collect tax and labor from farmers 
and herdsmen. Chinese Muslims lived in a variety of settings, often in close 
proximity to Han neighbors, while maintaining a separate communalized 
identity that left them as perennial outsiders (“familiar strangers,” as his-
torian Jonathan Lipman has called them), meaning that a breakdown of 
trust could result in violent, and collective recriminations against even well 
established communities.20 Two very different uprisings of the nineteenth 
century (grouped together as “Muslim rebellions”) resulted nearly twenty 
million deaths. Near the capital, the breakdown of public order during the 
Boxer Uprising provided the opportunity for violent recriminations be-
tween Han and Muslim villages.21
versity of Hawaii Press, 1999); Bingfang Han. “The Taigu School and the Yellow Cliff 
Teaching: Another Case of Transformation from Confucian Academic Group to Reli-
gious Sect,” in Popular Religion and Shamanism, ed. Xisha Ma, and Huiying Meng (Bos-
ton, Leiden: Brill, 2011); Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990).
18 Karen Barkey, “Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,” in Legal Pluralism and 
Empires, ed. Lauren Benton, and Richard J. Ross (New York: New York University Press, 
2013).
19 Vincent Goossaert, The Taoists of Peking, 1800–1949: a social history of urban clerics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007).
20 Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle, 
WA: University of Washington Press, 1997).
21 See the account in Peill, Arthur D. The beloved physician of Tsang Chou life-work and 
letters of Dr. Arthur D. Peill, F.R.C.S.E, ed. J. Peill (London: Headley Bros, 1908). A more 
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The policy of treating ethno-religious minorities as distinct internal 
communities continued into the twentieth century and beyond. Ethnic 
classifications were formalized in the early years of the People’s Republic, 
a time that actual treatment of religion was highly inconsistent. Numerous 
Buddhist monasteries, including those in Tibet and Mongolia, were sacked 
and looted. Muslim clerics were beaten, humiliated and forced to break 
dietary restrictions by consuming pork. In 2017, the world came to know 
the scale of abuses against the Uighur population of Xinjiang, including the 
secret detention of as many as half a million in “re-education camps.” The 
reasons, including fears of ethnic separatism in a place that is historically 
non-Han, often remain unspoken. Instead, policing of Xinjiang is justified 
in the name of rooting out radical Islam.22
But like other forms of religious persecution, it is important to re-
member that such religious brutality has come in waves. There have also 
been periods of greater tolerance, and many places did go to signifi- 
cant lengths to visibly accommodate a select set of officially approved 
cultural differences, especially in areas that were administratively des-
ignated as ethnic autonomous regions. Looking specifically at diet, 
state planners in the 1950s accommodated local Muslims in places like 
Harbin by subsidizing the price of beef to keep parity with pork, and 
local governments still keep strategic reserves of halal meat in order to 
stabilize prices in minority areas. Even under the People’s Communes, 
Muslims were often allowed to maintain a separate halal diet, maintain 
a separate slaughtering grounds, and keep dairy cattle for their own 
milk consumption.23
Chinese Christians, particularly those who had been in contact with 
missionary institutions, presented a more difficult case. While Muslims 
could be fit into the neat parameters of Stalinist ethnic classification, Chris-
tians were often characterized as a minority of choice, people who had vol-
detailed account may be found in Thomas David DuBois, “Religious violence in China 
since 1850,” in The Cambridge World History of Violence, Vol. 4, ed. Louise Edwards, Nigel 
Penn, and Jay Winter (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2019).
22 This is currently being documented in numerous journalistic, human rights and 
government reports. Rian Thum, “What Really Happens in China’s ‘Re-education’ 
Camps,” New York Times, May 15, 2018. Accessed March 8, 2019. https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/05/15/opinion/china-re-education-camps.html; Megha Rajagopalan, “This Is 
What A 21st-Century Police State Really Looks Like.” Accessed March 8, 2019. https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/the-police-state-of-the-future-is-already-here.
23 Interviews in Yunnan and Hebei.
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untarily turned their back on their own culture. They also made for easy 
scapegoats. The timing of the first major anti-Catholic political movement 
as part of the 1951 Suppress the Counterrevolutionaries Campaign, sug-
gests that the ill treatment of Chinese Christians during the early years of 
the PRC had less to do with real suspicion, than with their usefulness in 
establishing the authority of the new regime.24
Aiming to preemptively curate what would constitute religion in the 
reform era, the official rehabilitation of religion since the 1980s has com-
bined control of religions under state administration with alternating in-
difference to and persecution of those outside it. On the one hand, the five 
state-linked religions enjoyed protection and even patronage. During the 
1990s, even as the full force of the state was being mobilized against groups 
like Falun Gong (a topic that has been written about extensively elsewhere 
25), the temples, religious sites, schools and seminaries of the five state-
linked religions were being rebuilt or refurbished, often in lavish fashion 
and at state expense. In return, these religions would operate under, and 
submit fully to political leadership. The other side of this policy, the part 
that is reflected in the violent repression of underground Christian congre-
gations and Xinjiang Muslims, is one face of what some have called China’s 
“comprehensive war on religion.”26 But it is not universal. Even as clear 
repression takes place against certain groups, much of the Chinese land-
scape remains dotted with temples, religious iconography, and a strongly 
traditional ritual component in activities such as rural funerals. We can 
debate the real freedom or future of this unofficial religious sector, but its 
existence is fairly easy to confirm.
Policy tangibly shapes how state-linked religions express themselves 
theologically. Although China’s religion law allows proselytization within 
the premises of designated sites, content is monitored against the deliber-
ately soft parameter of “state security.” The result is often a watered-down 
24 Thomas David DuBois, Sacred Village: Social Change and Religious Life in Rural North 
China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005).
25 David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008).
26 Fifield, Anna. “With wider crackdowns on religion, Xi’s China seeks to put state stamp 





theology of the sort that characterizes interfaith dialogue, emphasizing 
generalizable expressions of community, social service and morality. To 
those who hear only of religious persecution, it will come as a surprise to 
learn that churches in China are often packed for Sunday and weekday ser-
vices, which are held in well-maintained buildings that are adorned with 
Biblical quotations about love and justice. But writings and sermons them-
selves play down the more potentially contentious aspects of the Gospel: 
such as the call to evangelize the non-believer, or the idea that the single 
road to Heaven lies through Christ.
The point here is that state-linked religions are as compelled as anyone 
to treat the public space as one of active moral performance, even within 
the walls of the church. Just as Chinese law bans expressions of religion or 
proselytization outside of designated religious sites (i.e., the secular public), 
so too does the performance of religion within the officially-designated 
religious sphere (the religious public, or to use terms literally, the religious 
secular) demand a theological reformulation that subjects difference to the 
themes of morality and social unity, and above these still: subjection of 
religious structures to state and the Communist Party.
Charity begins at work: The rise of China’s corporate citizens
Political ambivalence to the activities of private institutional actors, notably 
NGOs and charities, far predates the current regime. Imperial China had its 
own well established charitable tradition, which was deeply affected by the 
arrival of mission institutions in the late nineteenth century. Much of the 
change was organizational. Native charities had tended to be small, person-
al networks, tied parochially to clan or native place. Inspired by the arrival 
of larger and well-funded mission hospitals, soup kitchens and orphanages, 
Chinese activists of the twentieth century established a new generation of 
hybrid charities, including a Chinese branch of the Red Cross, and a native 
adaptation called the Red Swastika Society. As this new charity sector grew, 
the government of the Chinese Republic enacted the first of a series of laws 
that aimed to police its finances and foreign connections.27 The private chari- 
table sector continued to expand in response to the human suffering caused 
27 Joanna F. Handlin Smith, “Benevolent Societies: The Reshaping of Charity During the 
Late Ming and Early Ch’ing,” Journal of Asian Studies 46, 2 (1987); Cai Qinyu, and Li 
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by natural disasters and the Japanese invasion, but collapsed soon after 1949, 
as foreign missionaries were ejected, and the vast majority of Chinese groups 
closed in acquiescence to the claim that the new socialist state would need no 
such help caring for the needs of the people.28
The reemergence of the NGO sector in the 1980s raised the need for 
new regulation, at the same time shining a harsh light on deeper social 
issues. Private philanthropy reached a peak with the waves of donations 
in response to the disastrous earthquakes in Wenchuan (2008) and Ya’an 
(2013). But the decision to allow human and material aid from outside 
(especially from Japan or groups like the Taiwanese Tzu-chi Foundation) 
was received with some criticism, and the same openness of Internet dis-
cussion that fed the outpouring of private charity also highlighted two new 
sources of embarrassment: scandals involving the embezzlement of Red 
Cross donations (compounded by crass blogging by a young woman who 
claimed to be the mistress of one of the culprits), and the notorious cheap-
ness of many of the country’s new super-rich in the face of more long term 
problems of poverty and underdevelopment, a problem was publicly high-
lighted by none other than Bill Gates, as well as Chinese figures like action 
star Jet Li, who founded his own charitable foundation.29
By the new century, concern over private social initiatives spinning out 
of control prompted the passage of new regulations: the 2004 Foundation 
Management Law, and highly criticized Foreign NGO law of 2016.30 Like 
its predecessors from the 1920s, China’s new NGO law does not ban private 
Yuanfeng. “Shilun jindai Zhongguo shehui jiuji sixiang” [A Discussion of Social Relief 
Thinking in Modern China] Dongfang luntan 5 (2002); Zhe Ji, “Comrade Zhao Puchu: 
Boddhisattva under the red flag,” in Making Saints in Modern China, ed. David Ownby, 
Vincent Goossaert, and Zhe Ji (New York: Oxford, 2017); Zeng Guilin, “Minguo shiqi 
cishan lifa zhong de minjian canyu – yi Shanghao cishan tuanti lianhehui wei zhongxin 
kaocha” [“Civic participation in charity legislation of the Republic of China – an exam-
ination of the Shanghai Charities Association”]. Xuexi yu tansuo 197, 6 (2011).
28 Thomas David DuBois, “Before the NGO: Chinese charities in historical perspective.” 
Asian Studies Review 39, 4 (2015).
29 In contrast, Internet tycoon Ma Yun recently announced his intention to direct his atten-
tion to philanthropy.
30 State Council. “Regulations for the Management of Foundations 基金会管理条例: Adopted 
March 8, 2004. Effective June 1, 2004.” Accessed March 8, 2019. http://www.chinafile.
com/ngo/laws-regulations/regulations-management-of-foundations; National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee. “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Adminis-
tration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of 
China 中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境内活动管理法: Adopted April 28, 2016. Effective Janu-
ary 1, 2017.” Accessed March 8, 2019. http://www.chinafile.com/ngo/laws-regulations/
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charities directly, but demands that organizations and charities register, a 
process that can be made easy or onerous. NGOs with religious or foreign 
ties were scrutinized especially harshly, as were those that emphasized sen-
sitive domestic social problems. But just as with state-linked religion, the 
aim of regulation was less the destruction of social activism, than channel-
ing it into a more controllable form. Again resembling religion, this was 
done by taking philanthropy out of private hands, and moving it towards 
larger, politically linked entities.
The rise of “corporate social responsibility” (qiye shehui zeren) pro-
vided the vehicle, giving the state a new partner in its social initiatives, at 
the same time addressing many of the new economic realities of the new 
century. From a purely practical standpoint, concentrating philanthropy 
in the corporate sector has many advantages. It leverages the management 
expertise and reach of the commercial sector, and makes corporations will-
ing participants in key state initiatives in ecology, poverty alleviation and 
disaster relief, particularly at the local level.
Corporate philanthropy also reframes the biggest change in Chinese 
society – the selloff of state assets to a quickly expanding semi-private sec-
tor – in a moral light. This structural change began with the Asian finan-
cial crisis of 1998, and has accelerated over recent years, skewing Chinese 
economic growth towards clusters of artificially large, linked companies 
that have come to dominate strategic sectors such as food, real estate, en-
ergy and technology. These new companies are remarkably powerful, and 
many have at their command globally unmatched wealth and resources.31 
But this wave of consolidation has had a downside. Intended to be easier 
to regulate, large companies in fact spawned outsized problems. Scandals 
involving corruption, the abuse of concentrated wealth, forced evictions 
by real estate developers, exploitation of migrant workers, and egregious 
breaches of food, building and transport safety acutely irritated public sen-
timent, have provoked rare displays of dissent, in person and online.32
law-of-peoples-republic-of-china-administration-of-activities-of-overseas.
31 On the consolidation of TVEs and SOEs, see Cheng Jin, An Economic Analysis of the Rise 
and Decline of Chinese Township and Village Enterprises (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2017).
32 On the topic of migrant workers, see the excellent reportage from Viola Zhou, and 
Zhuang Pinghui, “Migrant workers take to streets of Beijing to protest against forced 
evictions,” South China Morning Post, December 10, 2017. Accessed March 8, 2019. 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2123714/migrant-workers-
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Discussion of CSR began just as this major economic shift, and its at-
tendant problems were taking off.33 Late in 2002, Renmin University host-
ed a conference to discuss “labor relations and CSR against background of 
globalization.” Over the next year, Beijing in Shanghai hosted numerous 
meetings on themes such as “enterprise value and social responsibility.”34 
These early discussions of corporate social responsibility were heavily in-
fluenced by foreign businesses operating in China, and included participa-
tion by the Ford Foundation, the Harvard Business School and the British 
Embassy. By virtue of their national prominence and political connections, 
the first and most vocal domestic proponents tended to be the largest Chi-
nese companies. One of the earliest to tie its public image to social philan-
thropy was the mega real estate developer Vanke, which released its first 
“green book on social responsibility” in 2005.35 Other key players, espe-
cially the well-connected and officially-favored “dragon head” companies, 
quickly followed suit. The institutionalization of CSR as part of the busi-
ness landscape was made final with its recognition in the new Company 
Law, which took effect on January 1, 2006.36
Writing in the official People’s Daily in the summer of 2007, Beijing- 
based economist Zou Dongtao explained two benefits of CSR.37 The first is 
that it encourages a moral atmosphere within the companies themselves, 
leading both workers and management at all levels to behave responsibly. 
This latter argument would become especially timely later that year with 
the beginnings of the greatest scandal of recent years: the sale of melamine-
laced milk and infant formula powder that killed six children and sickened 
hundreds of thousands nationwide.
The authors of the 2009 Blue Book of Enterprise Citizenship addressed 
the milk poisoning incident directly. Beginning with a litany of previous 
take-streets-beijing-protest-against; and the dossier available at https://www.scmp.com/
topics/migrant-workers-china. Broader coverage is available at Radio Free Asia: https://
www.rfa.org.
33 Li-Wen Lin, “Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural 
Change?” Berkeley Journal of International Law 28, 1 (2010).
34 Jiang Zhenghua, You Dongtao, Wang Zaiwen, and Feng Mei, Zhongguo qiye gongmin 
baogao shu [China corporate citizens report 2009], 2009. Beijing: Social Sciences Aca-
demic Press, 2009, 308.
35 Wanke qiye shehui zeren lüpi shu [Vanke CSR green book]. Text of annual reports are 
available from the company’s CSR webpage: https://www.vanke.com/citizenship.aspx.
36 Lin, “Corporate Social Responsibility in China,” 70.
37 Jiang, et al., Zhongguo qiye gongmin baogao shu, 2009, 6.
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scandals: milk powder that was sold stripped of nutrients, and expired 
product that was resold with fake brand packaging, the article focused on 
Beijing-based Sanlu, the company that was most directly implicated in the 
melamine event. From a 1950s-era collective, Sanlu had grown since the 
1980s as a politically favored enterprise and valued brand. Its downfall im-
plicated both the company and those who had let its abuses go unchecked. 
In September of 2008, after the extent of the scandal had become widely 
known, Premier Wen Jiabao bluntly described the reason as two separate 
lapses: the combination of “lazy government oversight and a lack by some 
companies of professional morals and social ethics.” The problem of over-
sight addressed in a major reorganization of the dairy industry and se-
ries of new food safety laws. Engendering a sense of morality that would 
“course like blood through the body of the entrepreneur” was of course a 
much harder task.38
The second benefit is that since corporations enjoy legal rights and a 
growing presence in society, they have a proportionate responsibility to 
recognize and uphold the rights of others. Perhaps unwittingly echoing the 
tone of religious moral precepts, Zou lists six recipients of a company’s 
“ethical dealing” (shan dai): stockholders, workers, customers, the natural 
environment, business partners and society at large. Although not stated 
here, this sort of argument in defense of the rise of large corporate interests 
echoes the early defense of socialism as being not only more just, but also 
more efficient way to serve the public good. This similarity is no illusion, 
since the newly privatized companies often work very closely with local 
government, which supplies finance and access to markets and materials. 
In return, CSR activities actively support state initiatives such as tree plant-
ing, disaster relief, and poverty alleviation.
Although written in the language of management theory, both of 
these arguments echo earlier public morality campaigns, in the sense that 
the performance of socially responsible acts is expected to produce bene-
ficial moral results, both for the actors themselves and for observers. The 
proponents are not naive. The writers of the 2009 report pointed out that 
Sanlu’s donation of 14 million yuan of milk to the victims of Wenchuan 
came at the very moment that it was working to cover the extent of the 
melamine poisoning in its own products. Rather, they envision a long-
38 Jiang et al., Zhongguo qiye gongmin baogao shu, 2009, 288–99.
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er road of educating management on the strategic value of honestly to 
a company. Promotion of socially responsible activities enhances brand 
identity, while CSR activities themselves build morale and a sense of 
common purpose. Channeling public philanthropy into CSR campaigns 
provides a powerful but controlled outlet for public sentiment, and is 
one way of presenting a major shift in China’s economic foundations as a 
positive development.
So again, where is the Chinese secular?
It should be obvious by now that this paper’s understanding of the secu- 
lar in China has very little to do with the absence or presence of religious 
organizations or symbolism. On the one hand, the tightly-controlled state-
linked religion sector is in many ways thriving. On the other, freedom 
within the unofficial sphere ebbs and flows. Against the violent persecution 
of Falun Gong, house Christians or Xinjiang Muslims, we must also weigh 
the vast number of religious sites and practices that survive by figuratively 
flying below the radar, even as actual surveillance techniques grow ever 
more sophisticated. Much of this religious efflorescence is euphemized as 
cultural heritage or ethnic custom. The practice of reducing this extremely 
complex landscape to a checklist of key “religious freedom” indicators is 
not likely to produce any real insight.
In Taylor’s description, state secularism is one very particular expres-
sion of ideological agnosticism in which the state cannot favor any one 
view in an organically diverse and intellectually free society.39 The fiction of 
a strict separation of the religious from the secular is a by-product of how 
these lines are drawn. Like free expression, and other supposedly absolute 
rights, the actual content of what any one jurisdiction considers religion, 
and thus what areas are off-limits from political interference, are them-
selves evolving products of custom and precedent, a point made both by 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and by Winnifred Sullivan.40
Further complicating China’s case, even beyond the fact that the coun-
try does very overtly espouse an official guiding ideology, is the fact that its 
39 Taylor, A Secular Age, 25.
40 Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom, 2015; Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of 
Religious Freedom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
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diversity is not organic. China’s diversity is highly scripted and structured. 
Taking ethnicity policy as an example, China still hews to a Stalinist model, 
one that recognizes a fixed number of ethnicities, and includes the category 
of “ethnicity” as an objective and immutable marketer of personal identi-
fication. There may be plurality of ethnicity or religion, but it exists within 
an externally imposed structure, one that leaves little space for personal 
interpretation.
But in a very different way, state secularism in China expresses very 
clearly an absolutely clear overriding ethic: the “civic religion” of illiberal 
utilitarianism.41 High political figures raise functional arguments for al-
lowing religion to exist: because outlawing it by fiat would be too disrup-
tive, and because state-controlled religion may have socially redeeming 
values.42 In this same vein, public morality is performed and praised be-
cause it produces socially desirable results: stability, unity, and economic 
growth. In each case, the state continues to take upon itself the paternal 
role of decider and engineer of social value. At its core, the Chinese secular 
remains precisely the recognition of this state-led illiberalism as the foun-
dation of society.
41 Jaclyn L. Neo, “Secularism without Liberalism: Religious Freedom and Secularism in a 
Non-Liberal State,” Michigan State Law Review, 333 (2017).
42 See discussion of contemporary views presented in Chi Zhen, and Thomas DuBois, 
“Opiate of the Masses with Chinese Characteristics: recent Chinese scholarship on the 
meaning and future of religion,” in Religious Studies and Marxist Approaches to Religions 
in China, ed. Lü Daji, and Gong Xuezeng, trans. Chi Zhen (Boston, Leiden: Brill, 2014).
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